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very position was in itself a confession that the great danger of war between the two nations was to be found in the desire of Governments to seek for groups of capitalists new fields of exploitation.

The Lichnowsky memoir is filled with expressions indicating the old and war-breeding point of view of the several nations and their representatives. For instance, "from the outset, the British statesmen took the position that England had no interest in Albania, and, therefore, did not mean to let war come on this issue." This particular interest, the absence of which would prevent England from going to war, was, we may see, purely economic.

Speaking of Germany, Lichnowsky says, "As in 1878 and in 1908, we had placed ourselves in opposition to the Russian program, although no German interests were involved." The Balkans were then referred to and the interests again were economic.

Prince Lichnowsky says "In the year 1898 a secret convention had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt and Mr. Balfour which divided the Portuguese Colonies in Africa into economic-political spheres of interest as between us and England . . . An agreement had been reached between us and England delimiting the interests of the two parties,"—this being in Portuguese Colonies with which neither England nor Germany, with any propriety, had political interests and should not have undertaken to enforce special economic rights.

Referring to the partition of Portuguese colonial possessions, the Prince says that "It was provided that in certain cases we should be authorized to intervene in the territories assigned to us for the protection of our interests"—in other words, political interference was to follow economic.

Referring to the negotiations which he carried on with England, Prince Lichnowsky says that "All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the South. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thomé and Principe which lie North of the Equator, and therefore really belong to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to enter energetic but unavailing protests."

In this respect we find France claiming an interest, her title to which must, at least, have been doubtful, even though better, if better such a thing could be, than that of England and Germany.

The Prince finds that sincerity of the British Government was demonstrated by the fact that Englishmen, desiring to invest capital in the districts assigned to Germany under the new treaty, were referred to Germany "with the information that the enterprise in question belonged in our sphere of interest."

When the Prince comes to the consideration of the Bagdad Treaty, he finds that its real purpose "was to divide Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although this expression was anxiously avoided out of regard for the rights of the Sultan." The thing itself was not avoided but the expression of it was to be shunned.

We learn with interest that "all the economic questions connected with the German enterprise were regulated in substantial accord with the desires of the German Bank." It is hard to conceive in this day when the

rights of the common people are assumed to be paramount, that in determining a question of possible war and peace, a settlement should be controlled by the wishes of a bank.

Again we find that the Germans were to be admitted "to participation in Basra Harbor Works," and that they were given rights in the Tigris which had formerly been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch. The Prince finds that under this treaty Mesopotamia, as far as Basra, became a German sphere of interest without prejudice to certain older British private rights, while Britain was to control the coasts of the Persian Gulf and Smyrna-Aidin line, the French, Syria, and the Russians, Armenia.

It is to be hoped, and we firmly believe, that the entrance of America into the world War will change the viewpoint of every statesman. It has not been our fashion to threaten or make war at the behest of private interests. In our vocabulary there are no such words as "spheres of influence." We do not know what it is to have vital economic interests in another nation, and we cannot afford in the settlement which must follow the present conflict, to measure the rights and privileges of people by the desires of German banks or English or American capitalists. There can be no freedom of development in any nation over which another nation claims a right of economic priority or control. This lesson had not been learned by the statesmen of the world when the present conflict began. Of this the negotiations between Sir Edward Gray and Prince Lichnowsky afford abundant proof. If it shall be learned as the result of all this war has cost and will cost, the conflict will prove in the end profitable to mankind.

A NATIONALISTIC INTERNATIONALISM

By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

Now that the world clearly understands the issues raised by Germany when it made its furious and long-prepared attack on the world's peace and order in August, 1914, and now that the free nations have come to so thorough an understanding both as to their duty and as to their opportunity, the end of the war is plainly in sight. The most highly organized and ruthless militaristic system that the world has ever known is going down in ruins before free men armed in a just cause. The infatuated and militaristic Germany of the past generation has staked everything upon appeal to force and has lost. It may be that the older and better German spirit, that which nursed philosophers of vision and poets of wide human feeling, may reassert itself and in time blot out the horrid record which the past generation has made.

The map of the world will have a strange look to those who are only familiar with the names and boundaries of 1914. National aspirations that have long been held in check by tyrannous force will now come to realization; submerged and subject peoples who have been oppressed and preyed upon will now gain either their autonomy or their independence. The public opinion of the world has been educated in these four years as it might not have been in four hundred years of ordinary happenings.

There is certainly to be a League of Nations which will be a genuine partnership of liberty-loving and right-thinking peoples. The object and purpose of this league will be to establish and to defend sound principles of international conduct. It will not waste much time in meticulous revision of the rules of war, for it will proceed upon the same assumption that the international law of peace is the normal international law and that the international law of war is abnormal and applicable only to a single method of settling international differences, and that the last and under most circumstances the least rational.

It will now be possible for Americans, like Britons and Frenchmen and Italians and Belgians and Japanese and Serbians and Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs and Greeks and others who love freedom, to give evidence that they have won the International Mind by joining together to forward the development of that true internationalism which rests upon nationalistic spirit and loyalty as a foundation, and which instead of denying and lessening patriotism adds to its significance and value by giving it new opportunities for expression and for service.

PACIDEMOCRACY

By ALFRED H. FRIED

Translated for the ADVOCATE OF PEACE by C. F. H.

IN the professional pacifist press, particularly in that of France, England and America, one finds just now much talk of "two Pacifisms," which need to be differentiated. In order to accomplish this most forcefully it is sought to give the ancient, veritable pacifism another name, one that will make it appear quite distinct from the pseudo-pacifism that has come forth during the war with startling significance. The manner in which the press and, with unreasoning concurrence, the general public opinion in all countries point out as a pacifist every person to whom the war is already burdensome or who longs achingly for a former age unrationed as to bread and fat, and the unanimity with which they stamp as pacifist every action which without consideration of the international situation that will follow aims merely towards the ending of the world-massacre—this is a direct result of the wild and aimless aspect of pacifism that, owing to pacifist doctrine itself, prevailed with unfortunately only too large a following even before the war. This confusion of "peace" with "peace" is something that I have continually brought out in my own writing during the last decade, pointing out the poverty of language that forces us to designate with a single word two such wholly different ideas. As the very basis of all peace doctrine I have declared with emphasis that one must make clear to oneself what the true significance of the one pacifist conception of peace is and what the difference is which separates it from what I have called the militaristic peace-concept.

The confusion existing between the two ideas through their expression in a common word was long ago the chief malady of the peace movement, the ground of the misunderstanding that would have split it in twain, and the headwaters of the opposition, the armory of their arguments. When the unworthy conception of peace as

non-war passes away and that belief in the virtue of attaining a mere silencing of weapons and a resumption of business-as-usual; then the peace-concept of pacifism reveals a state of international order protected by common justice, a condition which in the event of conflict makes decision possible by this order on the ground of rational procedure and rebukes the employment of stark force, or war. This does not mean a transmutation of actual war into a state of mere non-war, but the fundamental metamorphosis of the peace situation from one of latent war to that of the true organization of society of nations. I cannot permit myself here to go further into these fundamentals of pacifism. In many essays and other publications I have outlined clearly this central point of our movement.* It is sufficient here merely to point it out. I wish only to make clear that this evil which during the war has become in such great measure comprehensible, did not originate with the war, but found its origin in the superficial and indifferent manner in which the pacifist doctrine was accepted before the war, almost universally.

As "peace" was confused with "peace" in the old days, so today "pacifism" and "pacifism" are interchanged. The result is that those who understand peace only as non-war and who therefore strive only for the ending of this war, without regard for what condition we might find ourselves in thereafter, are declared to be acting and thinking pacifism and are without serious reflection termed "pacifists." This false designation has brought many of us to the point of seeking to find another name for the ancient doctrine and movement, one which will embody justly the principle of pacifism and make possible a distinction between it and that pacifism which sails under false banners—since we are not working for the ending of this war merely but of all future wars, through the erection of an international community based on rights and reason. This effort for a new name is understandable in the light of events of the day, where often true pacifists are compelled to suffer because a superficial press has identified them with an entirely different movement and misrepresented them to the volatile public. But it is nevertheless not beyond criticism. No institution, no idea, has ever gone quite free from misinterpretation, nor been safe from the false conceptions of the multitude. Yet for that reason it has not always been advisable to change the name of it. What is genuine will remain so and continue to clear a way for itself, despite all misrepresentation.

This changing of names we pacifists have already had to go through with once. At that time it was the "Friends of Peace" which we felt did not truly represent the purpose of our labors. "Friends of Peace" were we all, our antagonists as well as ourselves. Even the wildest war-fiends professed, as they today profess, that they waged war only for the love of peace. One who advertised himself merely as "Friend" of peace had in mind naturally merely the condition of non-war. He had no suspicion that it is not sufficient to love peace, but that before all else it is needful first to establish it. And so in order to give proper expression to this differ-

* I refer especially to my essay "The Fundamentals of Causative Pacifism" and my "Handbook of the Peace Movement."